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Abstract 
 
Kracauer’s rehabilitation in the 1990s sidelined his Marxist 
framework of the middle-to-late Weimar era in favour of the then 
still dominant if decaying paradigms of post-structuralism and post-
modernism. It was also silent on the relationship between Kant and 
Marxism in Kracauer’s work. This essay addresses these weaknesses 
by arguing that Kracauer transcoded the structure of Kant’s’ 
‘problematic’ around reification into a Marxist framework in the 
middle-to-late Weimar period. The essay considers how Kracauer 
conceived the mass ornament (photography and film especially) as a 
site of reification and critical pedagogy. It explores his strategies of 
de-reification and their overlap with Walter Benjamin and the 
ruptures and continuities between the radical Weimar work and his 
later Theory of Film. The essay argues that the Theory of Film can be 
better understood as a transcoding of Kant’s philosophy of the 
aesthetic in the third Critique into the film camera itself, although the 
Marxian framework of the Weimar period is now considerably 
attenuated. 
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 The Two Kracauers 
 
Siegfried Kracauer’s reputation, such as it was in the Anglophone 
world of film and cultural studies, used to rest on his two major film 
works written in exile in America: From Caligari to Hitler (1947) and 
Theory of Film (1960).  Yet the reception of Kracauer’s work was 
decisively shaped by the rupture of exile, which seemingly cut both 
Kracauer and his readership off from an understanding of his life’s 
work and the trajectory of his thinking. For it turned out there were 
‘two Kracauers’ and the American one could be read in a very 
different light when viewed from the perspective of the ‘Weimar 
Kracauer’ who inhabited a radically different intellectual-political 
milieu in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s. The Kracauer 
who had settled in America in flight from the Nazis seemed to be a 
sociological reductionist and naïve realist, which made him decidedly 
out of favor once film studies was institutionalised in the 1960s and 
1970s where auteur theory, structuralism and anti-realist theories 
followed rapidly on from one another (Petro 1991: 135). From 
Caligari to Hitler  in particular, by far the most well know of the two 
film books, came to be viewed as very problematic in its reflectionist 
and teleological model that purported to map a relationship between 
the German ‘psyche’, the films of the Weimar period and the growing 
receptivity of the German ‘nation’ towards authoritarianism. From 
Caligari to Hitler cast a long shadow over Kracauer within academia, 
but gradually, with the aid of the journal New German Critique and 
later in the mid-1990s Thomas Y. Levin’s English translation of The 
Mass Ornament, a collection of essays and articles from the Weimar 
period, the perception of Kracauer changed. Between 1921 and 1933 
Kracauer published approximately two thousand articles, reviews 
and essays, mostly in the newspaper where he worked as a journalist 
and commentator, the Frankfurter Zeitung. 2  These writings were, as 
Elsaesser noted, ‘a revelation’. 3  For they showed not only Kracauer’s 
links with critical theory, but also suggested that he sketched out 
many of the ideas in the 1920s that were to be subsequently taken up 
and developed by Benjamin and Adorno who it turned out must have 
been influenced by Kracauer (or perhaps that Kracauer formed part 
of a triumvirate in dialogue with each other) to a degree which they 
themselves had not acknowledged.  Restoring Kracauer’s links to 
German critical theory also opened up the possibility of re-reading 
his American writings and discerning there more complexity and 
sophistication than hitherto. 4  
 
I want in this essay to explore the continuities and ruptures between 
the Kracauer of the Weimar period and the more philosophical and 
general account of film that Kracauer offers in his late work, Theory 
of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality. One of the problems with 
the 1990s reassessment of Kracauer’s work is that it was largely 
dominated by the postmodernist and post-structuralist paradigms. 5  
Although disintegrating these paradigms maintained their influence 
in the 1990s, with their motifs and concerns still in circulation and 
thus overdetermining, along with the continued hegemony of the 
French intelligentsia within the Anglophone world, Kracauer’s new 
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reception. 6  So Kracauer’s interest in the fragment, in surfaces and in 
spectacle were seen to echo and anticipate key contemporary 
theorists such as Baudrillard, Foucault and Derrida. 7  What was 
downplayed in this reception was how the essays of the Weimar 
period help us understand Kracauer’s relationship to Marxism and to 
what extent that relationship continued in some attenuated and 
reconfigured form in the work of the American Kracauer.  Or 
perhaps, as some have argued, Kracauer’s engagement with Marxism 
was completely erased.  
 
To make matters more difficult in assessing Kracauer’s relationship 
to Marxism, Adorno’s account of his friend and one time mentor  
seems to confirm Kracauer’s distance from Marxism.  
 
One looks in vain in the storehouse of intellectual motifs 
for indignation about reification. To a consciousness that 
suspects it has been abandoned by human beings, objects 
are superior. In them thought makes reparations for what 
human beings have done to the living. 8  
 
Unlike many others in the 1960s when he wrote these lines, Adorno 
had been very familiar with Kracauer’s Weimar writings (and indeed 
encouraged the German edition of The Mass Ornament published in 
1963) so this statement is uncharacteristically off-beam, as we shall 
see.  But taking her cue from Adorno, Miriam Hansen is not alone in 
downplaying Kracauer’s Marxist framework. ‘Adorno rightly sensed 
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that his friend’s concept of material objects was not dominated by a 
Marxist theory of reification’. 9  In his highly problematic assessment 
of his old friend’s work, Adorno used a rather disreputable method of 
building a psychological profile of Kracauer and then reading his 
work off from that. According to Adorno, Kracauer was a  ‘man with 
no skin’. He had been flayed by a difficult childhood where he has 
been subjected to anti-semeticism that would of course later grow to 
monstrous proportions under fascism. 10  This left Kracauer 
constructing defensive barriers to protect himself and according to 
Adorno this included a certain resistance to commitments, including 
theoretical commitment. Hence there is in Kracauer’s work a lack of 
rigour, a suspicion of systematicity, an over-valuation of the 
importance of the individual and a certain tendency towards 
adapting to situations that suggests conformism.  Kracauer had a 
knack, says Adorno for ‘successful adjustment’. 11 One of the 
problems with Adorno’s assessment is that he makes no distinction 
between the Weimar Kracauer and the American Kracauer in exile. 
Could there in fact be a more radical disjuncture between the milieu 
of Weimar Germany and 1950s Cold War America? Is it not fanciful to 
assume the possibility of a seamless continuity between the two 
Kracauers? But the other major problem with Adorno’s assessment is 
that it is, quite simply, substantively wrong, as I aim to show, on the 
question of Kracauer’s work. For he did indeed have a theory of 
reification – especially in the Weimar period. However, to really 
appreciate Kracauer’s Weimar Marxism we have understand how he 
used it to transcode the work of Kant into historical materialist 
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terms.  Viewing Kracauer’s social critique from this Kant-Marx nexus 
will also help us understand how the American Kracauer as the 
author of A Theory of Film, had not abandoned entirely, but rather 
reconfigured his critical methodology of the Weimar years. As we 
shall see, Kracauer’s theory of reification was closely related to his 
engagement with photography and film, and one of things that does 
change in the work of the two Kracauers, is the assessment of these 
mass cultural mediums and their relationship to the problem of 
reification.  
 
 
Transcoding Kant 
 
Despite his highly critical assessment of Kracauer, Adorno 
acknowledged that it was Kracauer who was instrumental in his 
appreciation of Kant. For years, he spent Saturday afternoons reading 
Critique of Pure Reason with Kracauer, and it was he who ‘made Kant 
come alive for me’. From Kracauer, Adorno learned not to search for 
systematic unity in Kant (or any other philosopher’s work) but rather 
to read the work ‘as a kind of coded text from which the historical 
situation of spirit could be read’. 12  In particular Adorno learned how 
the ‘objective-ontological and subjective-idealist moments warred 
within it’. 13  This ‘war’ would be played out in the critical procedures 
Kracauer, Adorno and Benjamin developed, with Kracauer and 
Benjamin opting for a historical materialist phenomenology, as we 
shall see. But while Adorno acknowledges the importance of 
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Kracauer in his reception of Kant, it does not quite do justice to the 
influence of Kant within their work. For the contradictions of The 
Critique of Pure Reason were to be a model of the problems of critical 
reason within advanced capitalism – simultaneously imprisoned 
within the limits of a capitalist consciousness, and yet at the same 
time contradictory enough require in many instances only the merest 
of critical inflections to become a critique of reification rather than a 
reflector of it. 
 
Yet the influence of Kant is often disavowed. Kant is even highly 
influential in as self-consciously a Hegelian book as Lukács History 
and Class Consciousness. There Lukács built on Marx’s critique of 
commodity fetishism, where the relations between commodities in 
the market, for example their rising and falling prices, their 
availability or scarcity, their embrace of the masses or their 
exclusivity, acquires the appearance (not an illusion but an 
institutional reality within the ontologically stratified real) of an 
autonomous dynamic between commodities themselves and their 
universal means of exchange, money. The result is that the 
consciousness and will, the moral and political dimensions of our 
social being atrophy, becoming increasingly contemplative. 14  When 
the commodity structure becomes universalized through out society 
(once labour-power has become a universal commodity) its 
dominance, Lukács argued, pushes the fetishism inherent in it, 
through-out all institutional arrangements and conscious life. This 
generalization of fetishism Lukács called reification. As is well know, 
this generalization was grasped by Lukács through his reading and  
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appropriation of Max Weber’s distinction between formal and 
substantive rationality. But this distinction in turn derives from Kant, 
especially The Critique of Pure Reason, which provides the model of 
the problem for developing a critical consciousness and practice 
under capitalism. 
 
Firstly within the Kantian faculty of the understanding there is the 
contradiction between sense-perception (grounded in the empirical 
individual’s sensuous experience) and the universe of empirical 
concepts, and behind them, the pure a priori categories, which 
organized sense-perception into meaningful and intelligible 
arrangements. This structure – already problematic for Kant - had 
degenerated in the course of bourgeois intellectual history into the 
empiricism of sense-perception on the one hand unable to deal with 
the conceptual mediations that can analyze social relations and the 
abstraction of universal concepts indifferent to the historical 
specificity of material life on the other. Its terminus was logical 
positivism. This contradiction within the faculty of the understanding 
was intimately connected with the contradiction between the faculty 
of the understanding and the faculty of reason. The latter as the 
expression of our species-being capacity for moral-political Ideas has 
been incapacitated by the social relations of production. This finds its 
symptomatic philosophical expression in Kant’s work. Without Ideas 
that can animate reality according to a moral-political compass, 
material nature (the nature that we make) suffers from ‘petrification’ 
(a favourite metaphor of Kracauer’s). Thus Kant’s aesthetic turn in 
Critique of Judgment enters the Kantian philosophical architecture as 
a resource by which to reconnect reason with the faculty of the 
understanding and turn the dichotomy within the understanding 
between abstraction and sense-percepts into praxis. The transcoding 
of the structure of the Kantian ‘problematic’ on reification into terms 
congruent with a Marxist framework brings what is already 
symptomatically outlined in Kant’s philosophy to a point of critical 
consciousness. Furthermore it grounds the possibility of the 
consciousness in the historical material reality itself that needs 
changing. 
 
That Kant was aware of and dissatisfied by the fate of moral-political 
reason within his philosophy seems to me evident enough from the 
opening of the third Critique. There he makes a devastating 
admission, one that the bourgeois tradition of analytic philosophy 
understandably passes over in silence. For there Kant writes of ‘an 
immense gulf’ 15  between the faculties of the understanding and of 
reason, between cognitive judgments according to the visible nature 
of things and moral judgments according to the supersensible 
principles of ‘the good’. The objects of theoretical philosophy, 
mapped out in Critique of Pure Reason are the ‘concepts of nature’ 16 
which generates theoretical cognition governed by a priori principles 
immune to experience and the individual experiencing subject. 
Practical philosophy, which formed the basis of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, by contrast is governed by the concept of freedom, 
which negates the given determinateness implied by concepts of 
nature and ‘gives rise to expansive principles for the determination 
of the will’. 17  Practical philosophy is thus the domain of moral  
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philosophy, because it is only when we can make choices, when 
freewill becomes a possibility, that the reflection on the moral 
principles for our practices becomes relevant. But as Kant notes, 
most practical activity is in fact governed by the a priori conceptual 
principles of nature (or the transcendental subject). So Kant makes a 
further distinction within practical activity between the technically 
practical and the morally practical. 18  The technically practical comes 
under the domain of theoretical philosophy (essentially natural 
science) while the realm of morally practical action is hugely 
diminished and circumscribed on all sides by the realm of the 
technically practical. Reason appears to have little to do, it has little 
scope for ‘legislation’, when it comes to the domain of the technically 
practical. All it can do, as Kant puts it: 
 
…with regard to theoretical cognition (of nature)…(given 
the familiarity with the laws that it has attained by means 
of the understanding) is to use given laws to infer 
consequences from them, which however remain always 
with nature. 19  
 
Thus the shrunken scope of Kant’s moral reason stands exposed with 
courageous honesty and it is this that constitutes the central problem 
which the Critique of Judgment seeks to address, via the aesthetic. 
Kant’s aesthetic turn, as a means of thinking through the conceptual 
blockages of this reified situation, set the pattern for critical German 
philosophy in the twentieth century. 
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For the Weimar Kracauer the division between technical rationality 
(or the technically practical in Kant) and reason (morally grounded 
practical action in Kant) was a historical contradiction as it was for 
Lukács. Under capitalism reason has been hijacked by technical 
rationality (what Kracauer called the Ratio) reducing reason to an 
empty formalism poorly mediated with the real nature of things and 
as indifferent to the self as the transcendental Kantian subject. 
Kracauer’s back-story to the way contemporary technical rationality 
penetrates everyday life and mass media spectacles, is mapped out in 
his celebrated essay ‘The Mass Ornament’ (1927).  During the early 
stages of bourgeois/capitalist production (the Enlightenment) reason 
gradually penetrates nature and breaks down the ‘boundaries which 
nature has drawn’ on changing the basis of social life. 20  Significantly, 
from the perspective of the prefigurative role that the aesthetic can 
play, Kracauer believes that the advance of reason is already latent in 
pre-modern narratives such as fairy tales with their wish-fulfillment 
for social justice to triumph over poverty, scarcity and cruelty. 
 
There is a deep historical meaning in the fact that the tales of 
the Arabian Nights found their way to France during the 
Enlightenment and that reason in the 18th century 
recognized the reason of the folk tales as its own. In the early 
periods of history, pure nature was already superseded 
(aufgehoben) by the triumph of truth in the fairy tale. 21  
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The aesthetic of the mass ornament, preserves the pre-figurative role 
it had within the fairy tales and ‘represents form-bursting reason in a 
purer way than those other principles that preserve man as an 
organic unity’. 22  What a wonderful phrase that is: ‘form-bursting 
reason’, and how apposite to the cinema as we shall see, and to 
editing in particular, which disassembles and reassembles spatial 
and temporal relations and how they relate to material nature. Yet 
the promises of the Enlightenment to fulfill the utopian images of 
fairy tales went unrealized as capitalism more and more captured 
reason for its own purposes and turned it into technical rationality. 
This too finds its expression in the mass ornament. Taking the Tiller 
Girls as his example, Kracauer associated the abstract formal 
rationality of Ratio with ‘linearity’ as opposed to the unity of genuine 
reason – thus once more echoing the distinction between the 
mechanical sequencing of matter in Kant’s faculty of the 
understanding and the moral consciousness of the world to be found 
in the faculty of reason: 
 
The more the coherence of the figure is relinquished in 
favour of mere linearity, the more distant it becomes from 
the immanent consciousness of those constituting it. 23  
 
The masses on whom the system is based are the servants of the 
system not its masters. Linearity, the mechanical and mathematical 
organization of matter dispels consciousness from the arrangement 
in favor of the abstract Ratio, thus leaving reason marginalized from 
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material reality just as it was for Kant. Even prior to reading Marx 
around the mid-1920s, Kracauer grounded the Kantian realm of 
reason in collective practice rather than individual conscience in ‘The 
Group as the Bearer of Ideas’ (1922).  Ideas, Kracauer argues, 
invoking the Kantian realm of moral reason, exist in a state of 
‘should-being’, longing to realize themselves in a material reality that 
resists transformation. Ideas of moral (or political) reason long to do 
more than merely, as Kant lamented in the third Critique, ‘infer 
consequences’ from the laws of material nature. Although the 
‘individual does generate and proclaim the idea…it is the group that 
bears it and makes sure it is realized’. 24  This collective focus derives 
from Kracauer’s reading of Kant and points to another point of 
possible transcoding between Kant and Marx. For Kant’s 
transcendental subject and moral reason, whatever else can be said 
about them, are precisely attempts to push philosophy beyond the 
implicit individualism of empiricism and explicit moral-individualism 
of bourgeois homo-economicus. Implicitly the collective struggle 
against reification, which Kracauer evokes below is already acquired 
from Kant: 
 
It is always in periods of highest intensity that the soul 
goes beyond the merely – extant, beyond what is rule-
governed and necessary, and becomes part of the realm of 
freedom. But its wings cannot bear it aloft very long and, 
exhausted, it tumbles down toward reality…25  
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Perhaps Kracauer had in mind here the 1917 Russian revolution, or 
other cases when the promises of revolutionary change, the realm of 
freedom, settled for something less than the Ideas originally 
enunciated. In so doing, the Idea becomes ‘pure decoration’, a façade 
to disguise the ‘partly rotten interior’ with which power and extant 
reality have diverged from the Idea without admitting it.  The Idea 
has ‘been engulfed, raped, and abused by reality instead of 
transforming that reality according to its terms’. 26 Crucially, Ideas do 
not manifest themselves on the surface of material phenomena (and 
in their linear spatial-temporal relations), for material phenomena 
are subsumed under the abstraction of universal concepts. In this 
guise material phenomena, under the spell of Ratio, is enveloped in a 
new kind of nature – only superficially banished by abstract reason – 
so that mythology reasserts its power over man. ‘In spite of the 
rationality of the mass pattern, such patterns simultaneously give 
rise to the natural in its impenetrability’. 27 However, just because the 
‘mass ornament is the aesthetic reflex of the rationality to which the 
prevailing economic system aspires’ 28 did not mean for Kracauer 
that the mass ornament could be wholly dismissed, anymore than 
Kant’s partial internalization of bourgeois ideology could. On the 
contrary, mass culture was the very site where a critical pedagogy 
had to be launched. 
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Mass Culture and Pedagogy 
 
In his posthumously published book History: the last things before the 
last, Kracauer writes in Kantian fashion that institutionalization of an 
Idea inevitably means that ‘clouds of dust gather about it’ . 29 
Institutionalisation is equivalent to the universe of dominant 
concepts whose abstractness does (ideologically motivated) 
disservice to the Ideas they have appropriated. Thus Kracauer 
declares that he has always been interested in ferreting around 
amongst the rubbish of history, those things that have been 
marginalized and overlooked, that might speak more authentically 
about an epoch than the dominant voices, the legitimated cultural 
modes and the prevailing concepts of the time might. Here at least 
there is a strong continuity between the late and early Kracauer. ‘The 
Mass Ornament’ opens with what amounts to a foundational 
statement on the rationale for the study of popular culture in the 
twentieth century: 
 
The position that an epoch occupies in the historical 
process can be determined more strikingly from an 
analysis of its inconspicuous surface-level expressions than 
from that epoch’s judgment about itself. 30  
 
It is only the powerful who are in a position to make such judgments 
that silence and erase those voices that have been robbed of a say. 
Yet their presence and a more profound account of an epoch may be 
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found paradoxically in the apparently superficial mass cultural 
expressions of the day.  ‘The fundamental substance of an epoch’ says 
Kracauer, ‘and its unheeded impulses illuminate each other 
reciprocally’. 31  If for the later Kracauer the unheeded fragment 
becomes uncoupled from the ‘fundamental substance of an epoch’ 
here at least they are dialectically related and construct something 
like a totality, although a provisional one closer to that imagined by 
Benjamin and Adorno, than Lukács. 
 
Kracauer articulates a powerful democratic interest in the culture of 
the masses and a healthy skepticism of the pretensions of ‘art’. He is 
scathing of the intellectual class who flee the mass ornament and 
prefer ‘art’ that is largely cut off from the dynamics of contemporary 
reality. He is also dismissive of any attempts to give film or 
photography cultural pretensions by association with the legitimate 
arts of theatre or painting. Such strategies are really aimed at prising 
the new media out of the material nature of industrial modernity, 
which precisely gives them their political and pedagogic potential. ‘It 
would be well worth the effort to expose the close ties between the 
prevailing social order and artistic photography’ remarks the 
Weimar Kracauer. 32   Kracauer is able to cross the lines of cultural 
demarcation separating the intelligentsia from the culture of the 
masses in a way that makes him close to Benjamin and Brecht and 
which distinguishes him from Adorno’s mandarin distance from the 
popular. Hansen suggests that this is evident in Kracauer willingness 
to shift to the first-person when discussing the reception of the mass 
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media, either the singular or plural first person, implicating himself 
in the reception of mass culture in a way that Adorno could not 
contemplate. 33  Adorno recognized Kracauer’s distinctive 
methodology but denied it the originality it deserved, as a precursor 
to ethnographic particpant-observation in the field of cultural 
studies. Instead, he notes rather sourly: ‘With Kracauer, in place of 
theory it is always Kracauer himself who is already present in the 
gaze that grips the subject matter and takes it in’. 34 
 
What artistic attempts to boost the cultural legitimacy of the mass 
culture conceal is what is most important to learn: the essential 
emptiness of life under capitalism. The internalization of the logic of  
commodification within mass culture, both empties the mass 
ornament of an older connection to human feeling, psychology and 
the individual subject, and in so embodying reification provides an 
aesthetic experience of the core socio-economic conditions that 
predominate in contemporary society.  
 
When Kracauer uses one element of the mass ornament or spectacle 
(photography) as a metaphor to critique the social conditions which 
the spectacle as a whole represents, he demonstrates its potential 
political and educational value: 
 
The ornament resembles aerial photographs of landscapes 
and cities in that it does not emerge out of the interior of the 
given conditions but rather appears above them. 35  
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 Mass culture as a pedagogic vehicle for critiquing the very reified 
conditions it expresses: this sums up Kracauer’s highly dialectical 
reading of the situation. Here mass culture, as the embodiment of the 
Ratio, takes up the same position as the transcendental subject in 
Kracauer’s critical reading of Kant.  The subsumption of empirical 
experience to a rigid and abstract transcendental subject that is 
external to experience and dominates the individual subject from 
‘above’, is graphically translated into this image of the aerial 
photograph.  
 
Kracauer’s reading of the mass ornament means he reinterprets the 
by then popular concept of ‘distraction’ as a description of mass 
culture, dialectically. While in one important sense it is ‘distraction’ 
in the negative sense (diversion, compensation) the mass spectacle is 
also the place where: 
 
…the audience encounters itself; its own reality is revealed 
in the fragmented sequence of splendid sense impressions. 
Were this reality to remain hidden from the viewers, they 
could neither attack nor change it: its disclosure in 
distraction is therefore of moral significance. 36  
 
This from the 1926 article ‘Cult of Distraction’ summarises 
Kracauer’s key concerns: the potential for the audience to encounter 
itself in the distinct aesthetic form which bears the trace of their 
presence, their reality and their alienation, and from that to draw  
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moral-political conclusions in the name of reason against the abstract 
Ratio. The ‘Cult of Distraction’ essay focuses on the Berlin picture 
palaces which ‘raise distraction to the level of culture: they are aimed 
at the masses’. 37 Kracauer finds in the spectacle the quantitative 
presence of the working class in Berlin and their demand to be 
culturally satisfied that has eclipsed the traditional middle class 
culture. The older sites of middle class dominance, such as the 
churches are displaced by the new sites of worship just as the 
churches are also displaced by the new commodified urban spaces 
such as the hotel lobby. In his essay ‘The Hotel Lobby’ Kracauer in 
Kantian fashion juxtaposes the moral and spiritual collectivity of the 
House of God with the hotel lobby  - that transit station for atomized 
beings going about their private lives and desires.  The House of God 
for Kracauer is structured around a tension between its spiritual 
yearnings and residual collectivity and the material reality of modern 
capitalism, where as the space of the hotel lobby has dissolved all 
tension into an indifferent relaxation that obscures the fundamental 
exploitation on which the system based: 
 
In tasteful lounge chairs a civilization intent on 
rationalization comes to an end, whereas the decorations of 
the church pews are born from the tension that accords 
them a revelatory meaning. 38  
 
This invocation of the material object (in a work written between 
1922-25) as potentially releasing a revelatory meaning is strikingly 
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similar to Benjamin’s thinking, although whether this reflects 
Kracauer’s influence on Benjamin or Benjamin’s influence on 
Kracauer, is difficult to say.  
 
By 1926, with the urban masses now taking centre stage in his 
thinking, Kracauer explores the space of the Berlin picture palaces. 
This too is a commodified space, like the hotel lobby, but unlike the 
hotel lobby, populated by its bourgeois customers, the picture 
palaces sustain that same tension between utopian longing and 
material reality that Kracauer spied in the house of worship. Here 
one pole of the tension lies in the working day of the workers ‘which 
fills their day fully without making it fulfilling’. 39 This is matched by 
an aesthetic which is equally frenetic and shaped by similar 
imperatives: ‘The form of free-time busy-ness necessarily 
corresponds to the form of business’. 40  But here Kracauer detects a 
fragility in the aesthetic, a sense that the emptiness of the forms and 
the reality they are trying to conceal, is ever present: ‘Like life buoys, 
the refractions of the spotlights and the musical accompaniment keep 
the spectator above water’. 41  Although the philosophical framework 
is radical and coherent the argument is highly impressionistic and 
somewhat poetic. There is a tension and potential weakness between 
what the framework insists is the potentiality of distraction and the 
sense that the overwhelming tendency of the spectacle obeys the 
interests of capital. Berlin is the ‘home of the masses – who so easily 
allow themselves to be stupefied only because they are so close to the 
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truth’. 42 Stupification and revelation seem jammed together in a 
startling juxtaposition but it is hard to see in concrete terms how the 
passage from one to the other can be achieved. In part this is a gap 
between the philosophical framework and practical film criticism. 
For when Kracauer comes to view the empirical reality of German 
cinema, just two years later in his essay ‘Film 1928’ the sense of 
potentiality and optimism that ‘someday all this will suddenly burst 
apart’ 43  has evaporated entirely. German cinema is seen as shoddy, 
poorly executed, contemptuous of its audience, reprehensible in its 
evasiveness, escapism and ‘avoidance maneuvres’. 44 Although film 
and photography may be emblematic of a new form of consciousness 
able to round on the alienation which it expresses, like Benjamin, 
Kracauer finds this potential realized less in empirical film examples 
than in his own modes of decoding strategies – and it is this which 
closes the gap between potentiality and actuality. 
 
 
Aesthetic Strategies of De-reification 
 
In his 1928 review of Walter Benjamin’s recently published books, 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama and One Way Street, Kracauer 
identifies Benjamin’s strategies of de-reification. Against the Kantian 
transcendentalism of the first Critique with its subsumption of the 
particular (sense-impressions) under the universal, Benjamin 
pursues a ‘monadological’ approach that is strikingly similar to 
Kracauer’s materialist phenomenology. Benjamin’s approach (and by 
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implication Kracauer’s) is ‘the antithesis of the philosophical system, 
which wants to secure its grasp of the world by means of universal 
concepts, and the antithesis of abstract generalization as a whole’. 45 
Yet if Benjamin and Kracauer are critical of Kant’s transcendental 
subject from the first Critique, they both use the overall structure of 
his problematic in which the division between objective material 
reality and moral-political reason is addressed via the mediating role 
of the aesthetic. Even within the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
acknowledges the limits of the faculty of understanding, with its 
linear sequencing of sense impressions (synthetic judgments) 
subsumed under logical relations (a priori synthetic judgments). 
Besides the painful fissure between understanding and reason, 
another site where Kant’s misgivings emerge is in the distinction 
between phenomena and noumena, the latter functioning as a rebuke 
to the limitations of Kant’s own empiricist philosophical structure. Of 
course this distinction anticipates Marx’s later distinction between 
phenomenal forms, critiqued as suffering from an extremely 
restricted cognitive reach, and real relations.  Yet Kant also flips the 
critique around and reminding reason of its tendency towards 
idealism 46  identifies reason and rationality as a problem when it 
becomes too uncoupled from the experiential life of the subject. Marx 
too, it should be remembered, started Capital with a thing 
perceptible to the senses: the commodity. With the degeneration of 
neo-Kantianism into logical positivism, both Kracauer and Benjamin 
were drawn to a materialist phenomenology that would recover 
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experience from the abstractions of theory and the thinness of the 
merely empirical. As even Adorno noted:  
 
Phenomenology was for those who wanted to be dazzled 
neither by ideology nor by the façade of something subject 
merely to empirical verification. Such impulses bore fruit 
in Kracauer as in few others. 47  
 
If the embryonic outlines of a future logical positivism are 
retrospectively discernable in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
the origin of the dialectical image, where the experiential is 
mediated with a critical philosophy that illuminates its social 
conditions, may equally be discerned in the Critique of 
Judgment. Kant’s aesthetic turn is an attempt to link the 
empirical and experiential to that which transcends the 
empirical and the experiential (the noumenal essence of things) 
and that in turn requires a mediating subject of moral reason to 
mobilize principles and Ideas (or critical theory) to represent 
supersensible realities. The experiential/empirical, the 
noumenal/real essences and a critical framework mobilized by 
the moral-political subject are the three points of a triangle that 
constitutes Kracauer and Benjamin’s materialist 
phenomenology. Quite explicitly, Kant’s methodological shift in 
the third Critique is the aesthetic strategy of metaphor (what 
will become the dialectical image), which he calls reflective 
judgment: 
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‘To reflect…is to hold given presentations up to, and 
compare them with, either other presentations or one’s 
cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that 
this [comparison] makes possible. 48  
 
At a stroke Kant here opens up a legitimate space for a critical 
subjectivity that suspends the reified power of universal concepts 
and makes it possible, through analogy or metaphor to think a 
concept through comparison that it was not possible to think before, 
under the model mapped out by the faculty of the understanding in 
the first Critique. 
 
Similarly, Kracauer and Benjamin turn their critical gaze against the 
transcendental subject of the understanding and evoke instead a 
radically reconfigured Kantian subject of political-moral reason – the 
subject of Ideas which are a ‘discontinuous multiplicity’ to be found 
in ‘the murky medium of history’. 49  The murky medium of history 
must be recovered from the phenomenal world as it is presented 
according to the faculty of the understanding whose combination of 
empirical immediacy and abstract universalization reveals virtually 
nothing of the essentials of social life, but is instead a model of 
ideological thought. As Kracauer puts it: ‘he who faces the world in its 
immediacy is presented with a figure that he must smash in order to 
reach the essentials’. 50  The aesthetic is the methodology of 
‘smashing’ and allegorical reassembling. In ‘The Hotel Lobby’ the 
reassembling seems to lean towards a traditional aesthetic of unity. 
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 The more life is submerged, the more it needs the 
artwork, which unseals its withdrawnness and puts its 
pieces back in place in such a way that these, which were 
lying strewn about, become organized in a meaningful 
way. The unity of the aesthetic construct, the manner in 
which it distributes the emphases and consolidates the 
event, gives a voice to the inexpressive world, gives 
meaning to the themes broached within it. 51 
 
After his Marxian turn however the reassembling that is envisaged 
does not aspire to aesthetic unity: ‘the façade must be torn down, and 
form cut to pieces’. 52  Film provided the philosophical justification 
for this aesthetic as Walter Benjamin was to later suggest in ‘The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’: 
 
Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and 
furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories 
appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the 
film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of 
the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-
flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go 
travelling. 53 
 
Here Benjamin stresses the potentialities of the medium as a 
productive cognitive augmentation of the human eye which in 
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transforming our relations to material nature is at the same time 
registering new social meanings, relations and possibilities 
slumbering within that material nature but unrecognized because we 
are ‘locked up hopelessly’ within it. Film explodes this reified world, 
turning it into ‘ruins and debris’, which is to say montage elements 
that can be reconfigured dialectically for cognitive travelling.   
 
The terms ‘ruins’ and ‘debris’ reminds us that for Benjamin the inert 
qualities which reified material nature acquires under capitalism can 
be counteracted when that material nature breaks down in some 
way. A key term through which we can understand Benjamin’s 
conception of the dialectical image is decomposition. This is a double 
death: the death which the commodity brings to the living and the 
potential to in turn bring the living back to a more authentic life via 
the death of the commodity. Decomposition as death in this double 
sense and as a methodology are linked for example in Benjamin’s 
theory of the collector. The collector lovingly brings back obsolescent 
commodities whose original uses and exchange values have died, 
reconstructing their history as a ‘magic encyclopedia’ that traces the 
‘fate of his object’. 54 (Benjamin 1999a: 62). The collector has an 
intense personal relationship with the commodity ambiguously 
different from the way the commodity interpellates the subject when 
the commodity is in its full glory as the ‘prodigies’ of their day 55 
Death makes the commodity more receptive to the living, its powers 
over the living weaken with its historical displacement into the 
collector’s arrangement of artifacts. Benjamin quotes Marx in the 
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Convolute on The Collector in The Arcades Project: ‘I can, in practice, 
relate myself humanly to an object only if the object relates itself 
humanly to man’. 56  The possibility of a human relationship (of the 
kind found today through Freecycle and using second hand shops) 
opens up only with the obsolescence of the commodity. At that point 
the object becomes meaningful, which is to say, through 
decomposition, the object from history becomes allegorical. As 
Benjamin cryptically puts it in The Arcades Project: ‘Broken-down 
matter: the elevation of the commodity to the status of allegory’. 57 
The collector and the allegorist share an interest in recovering 
meaning from history and this means disrupting the positivist 
cataloguing of history as a linear sequence of events.  Their modus 
operandi is close to Proust’s mémoire involuntaire, where a 
‘productive disorder’ 58 predominates.  Here memory plays the 
central role in recovering Ideas from the ‘murky medium of history’. 
 
All these quintessentially Benjaminian themes around death, 
montage, the commodity, memory and history are to be found in 
Kracauer’s brilliant 1927 essay ‘Photography’. The essay begins with 
a juxtaposition, or what Benjamin would call, a constellation, 
between two photographs. One is a contemporary photograph of an 
unnamed film star, a public property who everyone ‘knows’ and the 
other is from the personal family album, a picture of ‘grandmother’ 
taken in 1864, about whom family members know rather little, 
except for a few scraps of information and rumor. Unlike the film star 
who is alive, the body of the grandmother, because it has no indexical 
                                                        
56 Benjamin 1999b, p.209. 
57 Benjamin 1999b, p.207. 
58 Benjamin 1999b, p.211. 
relation to a living body, seems to dematerialize leaving only 
something of a museum piece – a mannequin in a glass, labeled, 
telling the viewer ‘how women dressed back then: chignons, cinched 
waists, crinolines, and Zouave jackets’. 59 The fashions of the time 
captured in the photo, now dated, suddenly seem funny to the 
grandchildren whom Kracauer here introduces as amused 
consumers of this ‘relic’ from 1864. Interestingly, although Kracauer 
makes no further reference to it, the Zouave jacket was modeled on 
the uniform of the French colonial army partly composed of Berber 
tribes recruited during the annexation of Algiers by France in 1830. It 
is not then just the ‘cultural treasures’ of the past that come down to 
us with an underside dripping in blood and barbarism, as Benjamin 
noted 60 but the frivolous and transient products of mass culture, 
such as fashion.  
 
Although Kracauer ignores the colonial dimension, he notes the 
theme of death and obsolescence that still ‘protrudes into our own 
time like a mansion from earlier days that is destined for destruction 
because the city centre has been moved to another part of town’. 61 
The children laugh, but they also ‘shudder’ in the presence of this 
double death (of the grandmother and of the fashionable 
commodities no longer fashionable). The contemporary image of the 
film star is by contrast bolstered in its apparently self-sufficient 
meaning by the fact that the film diva herself is still alive – her 
‘corporeal reality’ 62 conceals the hollowness that Kracauer wants us 
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to confront via the 1864 photograph. ‘The old photograph has been 
emptied of the life whose physical presence overlay its merely spatial 
configuration’. 63  In so doing the public photograph is revealed to be 
enshrouded in the secrets of private property while the private 
photograph reveals something interesting about our historical 
condition.  
 
This phenomenological materialist constellation of photographs 
bursts out of the historicism which Kracauer sees photography 
ordinarily buttressing. Historicism of the kind advocated by Dilthey, 
expresses the logic of capital and understands events according to a 
linear succession of causes and effects. Historicists believe that ‘they 
can grasp historical reality by reconstructing the course of events in 
their temporal succession without any gaps’. 64 Photography provides 
the spatial equivalent of this temporal conception, while the moving 
image equivalent would ‘be a giant film depicting the temporality of 
interconnected events from every vantage point’. 65 Confronted with 
this mechanical conception of historical time in which events are only 
externally related according to immediate cause-effect relations, 
Kracauer anticipates Benjamin’s strategy of trying to ‘blast open the 
continuum of history’ 66  with its myth of progress. The 1864 
photograph is used to trigger what Kracauer calls ‘memory images’ in 
much the same way that Benjamin looked to Proust’s mémoire 
involuntaire to disrupt official history based on empirical recording 
and cataloguing. ‘Photography grasps what is given as a spatial (or 
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temporal) continuum; memory images retain what is given only 
insofar as it has significance’. 67  Yet it is through photography that 
photography can be made to speak, to unseal its muteness through 
memory images that are premised not on an ambition of empirical 
completeness but on ‘a jumble that consists partly of garbage’. 68 
Once again decomposition recommends itself as a way of 
counteracting the meaninglessness of mute nature and recovering a 
real history buried in the photographic image ‘as if under a layer of 
snow’. 69 
 
Unaided by a critical philosophy that can reconstruct what the 
photograph conceals, photography will follow ‘natural necessity’ 
which is one reason perhaps why fantasy genres, going back to 
Kracauer’s interest in fairy tales, has long had an appeal to Marxists. 
‘In order for history to present itself, the mere surface coherence 
offered by photography must be destroyed’. 70 Here it is 
decomposition which counter-attacks photography as ‘a secretion of 
the capitalist mode of production’. 71  Thus the grandmother’s dress 
achieves ‘the beauty of a ruin’. 72  Recently outdated it is caught 
between still wanting to make a claim on us in terms of its nowness 
and the fact that it is effectively cast aside by the ‘march’ of history. 
Disrupting that linear march Kracauer’s juxtaposition works to 
expose the vacuousness and emptiness of the commodity world we 
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have surrounded ourselves with: ‘Those things once clung to us like 
our skin, and this is how our property still clings to us today’. 73 
 
Rather than having an uncritical investment in the ‘beningness of 
things’, as Adorno thought 74 Kracauer argues that these are things 
whose depersonalization forces us to take a lesson in the indifference 
of the commodity to human life, but it is a lesson we can only be 
receptive to when the human figure is displaced by death. Death 
drives a wedge between the image and that which it resembles and in 
effect opens the image up to a genuine historical consciousness. 
Death/displacement hollows out the unity and linearity of the image: 
‘The contiguity of these images’ says Kracauer, again evoking Kant’s 
sequential ordering of sense-percepts under abstractions, 
‘systematically excludes their contextual framework available to 
consciousness’. 75 Thus death and displacement is in a dialectical 
relationship with a genuine living historical consciousness at the 
point of reception, and this again suggests how wrong Adorno was in 
arguing that dialectical thought for Kracauer ‘never suited his 
temperament’. 76 Conversely the photographs that the new mass 
media mobilize is ‘a sign of the fear of death’ which is dialectically 
related to a fear of a genuine life beyond reification:  
 
In the illustrated magazines the world has become a 
photographable present, and the photographed present 
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has been eternalized. Seemingly ripped from the clutch of 
death, in reality it has succumbed to it. 77  
 
Just as the proletariat are both commodity and the potential 
destroyer of commodity society, so mass culture is both the 
production of commodity consciousness and the potential place 
where a commodified consciousness can see this reification at work 
and work against it. Kracauer extended Lukács’ analysis into the 
sphere of the new industrial culture that Lukács consigned only to 
the realm of reification and in so doing, required a very different 
philosophy of the aesthetic. The engagement with mass culture as the 
dialectical staging ground for both reification and its critique was for 
Kracauer ‘the go-for broke game of history’. 78 It was to be a game that 
the left decisively lost with the rise of the Nazis and the death of the 
Weimar Republic.  
 
Theory of Film: continuities and ruptures 
 
Miriam Hansen has reconstructed the process of production of 
Theory of Film (repressed in the finished product) noting its long 
genesis from draft outlines written as far back as 1940 where 
Kracauer was still strongly influenced by the radical Weimar culture 
of the 1920s and 1930s, to the finished product completed during the 
1950s, when Kracauer’s transformation into a liberal humanist 
conforming to the cold-war American scene was seemingly 
complete.79  Yet traces of the earlier Kracauer still remain here and 
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there in Theory of Film: the redemption of physical reality, and not 
only in the subtitle of the book which indicates that reality needs to 
be de-reified or redeemed. They burst out of the page in passages 
that seem a world away from the overall de-politicised framework 
and empirical methodology.  For example, in the references to Proust 
and more surprisingly to Benjamin, the flaneur and ‘the streets’ of 
modernity – all look back, or seem to look back to the radical culture 
of the 1920s and early 1930s. 
 
However Inka Mülder-Bach argues that the appearance of 
continuities between the Weimar and American Kracauer is 
deceptive:  
 
figures of speech, motifs, and images – are preserved, but 
the structure in which they are embedded has changed. 
They alter their positions, which become elements of  
completely different theoretical moves. 80  
 
Mülder-Bach reads Kracauer as reversing his earlier critique of 
photography as the imagistic equivalent of historicism and instead 
he now celebrates its apparent bracketing of subjectivity in the 
name of a frozen objectivity divorced from the subject. This 
combined with the eclipse of any critique of abstract rationalism in 
the later writings and his apparent fetishism of the fragment or what 
Mülder-Bach calls the ‘totalization of the periphery’ 81 in contrast to 
the dialectic between the inconspicuous and marginalized fragment 
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and its relationship to the totality – the ‘fundamental substance of 
the epoch’ as he put it in ‘The Mass Ornament’ – would seem to 
confirm that a chasm exists between the two Kracauers. Broadly I 
think Mülder-Bach is right to stress a disjuncture, but nevertheless, 
some genuine continuities remain and a little more nuance is 
required. Remembering Kracauer’s relationship to the Kantian 
problematic might also aid us here. 
 
We may recall that Kracauer did in fact make the displacement of 
subjectivity part of his critical method in the ‘Photography’ essay.  
Although that essay is ‘inseparably bound to the transformative 
powers of subjectivity’ 82 those powers could only be generated via 
the displacement of the subject within the image (the film star, the 
grandmother). There are thus two models of the subject that 
Kracauer is working with: a bourgeois model of the subject that puts 
the subject at the centre of things to the detriment of history and 
material structures and processes and a critical subject alive to 
historical materialism. We have seen that Kracauer consistently 
attacked any attempt to prise both photography and film out of their 
embeddedness in industrial modernity by associating them with 
‘legitimate’ cultural practices such as painting and theatre. For this 
reason Kracauer dismisses those elements of the architecture of the 
Berlin picture palaces that give film high cultural pretensions as ‘if 
designed to accommodate works of eternal significance’. 83  In 
Theory of Film Kracauer continues to make the same argument 
against the work of Moholy-Nagy and Mary Ann Dorr for example, 
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where the ‘expressive artist’ pushes photography back towards 
painting. 84  
 
However, if one reads Theory of Film either as a complete rupture 
from the Weimar Kracauer or without any knowledge of the Weimar 
writings, then it would be easy to think that Kracauer’s polemic 
against bourgeois subjectivity has been turned into a polemic on 
behalf of a naïve theory of realism (the expression of bourgeois 
materialism rather than bourgeois subjectivitism). Thus Kracauer’s 
critique of artistic over-composition could be read as a hymn to the 
mechanical objectivity of the camera which should be left to ‘catch 
reality in its flux’ as he put it. 85 Yet at one level Kracauer very clearly 
rejects such a model of realism: 
 
Actually, there is no mirror at all. Photographs do not just 
copy nature but metamophose it by transferring three-
dimensional phenomena to the plane, severing their ties 
with the surroundings, and substituting black, gray, and 
white for the given color schemes (Kracauer 1997: 15). 
 
Kracauer was a very ‘curious realist’ as Adorno rightly noted. The 
idea of the camera as intrinsically about the morphing of matter, as a 
matter-morpher, is something I would like to elaborate on. It would 
seem to suggest a position quite close – if also stripped of the radical 
critical framework – of the Weimar years and Benjamin’s position 
that with allegory, history (and nature) decays into images and thus 
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become subjectively appropriable once more. With the camera, 
reality is de or recomposed into images which can then acquire 
allegorical meaning. Yet Kracauer’s position it must be admitted 
remains undeveloped and very ambiguous. The general context of 
his discussion of photography is one that tries to establish what kind 
of subjective disposition the image producer ought to have vis-à-vis 
the camera given the latter’s own essential characteristics and 
qualities. The camera he suggests has certain built-in ‘affinities’ with 
aspects of reality that give it a materialist orientation. For example it 
has an affinity towards ‘unstaged reality’ which does not at all mean 
that Kracauer believes that film is or ought to be unstaged, but 
rather that within that process of staging there will also be a 
dynamic that testifies to the independence of material nature from 
our shaping activity. Linked with the unstaged dimension within the 
staged, is the camera’s sensitivity to the fortuitous, the random and 
the accidental – all those contingent dimensions of independent 
material nature that cannot be predicted.  This then links with a 
third characteristic, that of incompleteness, the fragmentary and 
open-ended nature of the reality it reproduces. Finally the 
photographic is marked by a certain indeterminateness in terms of 
its meaning – and here we can see an example of how Kracauer 
might be read in relation to a post-structuralist notion of polysemy. 
86  It perhaps ought to be noted that Kracauer’s prescriptions here 
are also echoed to some degree by Adorno in his later essay ‘Film 
Transparencies’, but then we have already seen that his assessment 
of Kracauer was not Adorno’s finest hour. 
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We may get a better sense of where Kracauer is coming from if we 
understand his discussion of the camera and its objectively 
structuring characteristics which turn out to have some of the 
characteristics often associated with subjectivity (the accidental, the 
incomplete, the indeterminate) if we see the whole discussion as a 
transposition of Kant’s transcendental subject. For Kant, as we have 
seen, the transcendental subject of the first Critique is an objective 
structure independent of the empirical individual and providing the 
conditions for their sense-perceiving activity. The camera may thus 
be seen as something like the Kantian transcendental subject, its 
social-technical basis, derived from industrial modernity resists 
excessive artistic over-composition that tries to pull ‘camera-reality’ 
back to painting. Yet at the same time the camera is not associated 
with the kind of reified objectivity that Kracauer’s Weimar self once 
ascribed to it as the metaphorical realization or material 
embodiment of an abstract universalism that mimics the 
transcendental subject of the first Critique.  Instead he now seems to 
give the photographic image some of the qualities that he once 
suggested could only be generated by a subjective re-appropriation 
of photography by the radical critic adopting de-reifying strategies 
that could break down the false immediacy of the image. In short he 
is modifying the Kantian transcendental subject of the first Critique 
by giving it (the camera) features that seem to be objectively 
subjective. Kracauer’s trajectory thus parallels Kant’s own aesthetic 
turn, where in the third Critique Kant explores the possibility of an 
interpenetration between the objective and the subjective that 
modifies both, de-reifying the transcendental subject and socializing 
the individual subject by introducing culture and the aesthetic.  
 If the Weimar Kracauer grounded his critical practice in the 
theoretical potentialities of industrial mass culture, there was 
nevertheless, as we have seen, a gap between that potentiality and 
the actual practice of mass culture, as Kracauer’s disillusioned essay 
‘Film 1928’ suggested. The American Kracauer then seems to 
reverse the terms of the problem by now grounding in a much more 
detailed way, the characteristics of decomposition more readily 
within the medium of the image itself rather than the critical 
discourse or interpretation, but at the risk of severely attenuating 
the radical philosophical framework which the critic brings. 
Nevertheless this objectively subjective quality of the photographic 
image, or what Kant called the ‘subjectively universal’ in aesthetic 
judgment 87 may be rephrased as nothing more than saying that the 
camera is fundamentally about perception and meaning, but 
perception and meaning is not to be understood here as subjective 
in the sense of the empirical individual, but instead it is meaning and 
perception that is social and cultural in its implications and origins. 
 
Here we must return in more detail to Kant because in essence the 
passage from the first to the third Critique is, as I have indicated, 
precisely a search for an aspect of the transcendental subject that 
operates somewhere between the reified universal of nature as 
given, the abstract principles of moral reason where free will is 
posited but unrealized and unrealizable, and the subjective, 
empirical and experiential world of the individual subject.  Kant 
finds this aspect of the transcendental subject in the aesthetic, a 
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mediating or middle ground judgment between the dualities of 
Kant’s philosophical architecture. In the ‘Dialectic of Aesthetic 
Judgment’ in the third Critique Kant asks how an aesthetic judgment, 
which involves subjective play can also have characteristics 
associated with objective concepts  (of either the understanding or 
reason) which ‘demand’ agreement? His answer effectively is that 
the aesthetic is a mode of judgment that is both objective and 
subjective, but the meaning of each term changes when brought 
together. 
 
A judgment of taste is not based on determinate 
concepts…A Judgment of taste is indeed based on a 
concept, but on an indeterminate one (namely, that of the 
supersensible substrate of appearances). 88  
 
The aesthetic then has certain qualities that lift it beyond the merely 
private and subjective assertion of judgment and insofar as that is 
true it is based on a concept. But this concept is not a determinate 
one of the kind that governs the faculty of the understanding where 
cognition is shadowed by reification. The concept is an 
indeterminate one, not bound by empirical proofs yet still open to 
inter-subjective assessment and re-assessment. Moreover the 
aesthetic judgment is based, like moral reason, on the supersensible 
substrate that underpins appearances. Kant is here referring 
explicitly to the supersensible substrate of humanity where this 
power for aesthetic judgment resides. But we can easily extend the 
concept of the supersensible substrate out towards the world 
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around us, given that for Kant the noumenal dimension includes 
both that which is within us and that which is outside us, i.e. that 
which underpins the world of appearances that do come to our 
sense apparatus for cognitive judgment in the faculty of the 
understanding. Thus we have the basis in Kant for thinking of the 
aesthetic in a way that became common within 20th century Marxist 
cultural theory: namely as a critical resource within a reified society. 
To be sure I am constructing a genealogy that is only tacitly and 
rarely self-consciously articulated in the work of Kracauer himself, 
but so foundational is Kant for him (as for Adorno) that we cannot 
really understand the play of his thought and development without 
shading in the great dramatic struggle against reification that Kant 
himself undertook. 
 
In Kracauer’s late work the qualities of the aesthetic are lodged 
within the camera itself and not merely the philosophical framework 
of the critic. It is in this sense that the camera is matter-morphing, it 
has a social-technical built –in predisposition to allegorise in the 
Benjaminian sense. One example of the way camera-reality is 
subjectively universal is the way it can intervene and re-shape our 
unconscious interaction with our environment. When our everyday 
surroundings, objects and people become ‘part of us like our 
skin…they cease to be objects of perception’.89 It is clear that our 
habitual and unconscious activity within this material environment is 
a socially determinate one in that the familiar world conditions ‘our 
involuntary reaction’ 90 Cinema can defamiliarise this environment to 
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some extent and renew our perceptual engagement with it because 
its ‘raw material’ is precisely unknown perspectives.  ‘Unlike 
paintings, film images encourage such a decomposition because of 
their emphatic concern with raw material not yet consumed’. 91  
 
Habitualised modes of seeing are thus subjected or at least can be 
subjected to decomposition by the camera and editing’s 
predisposition towards seeing things from new angles and 
perspectives, from ‘raw material not yet consumed’. Kracauer 
discusses the relationship between material reality, conventional 
figure-ground optics and the decomposition by recomposition 
possibilities of the camera: 
 
Imagine  a man in a room: accustomed as we are to visualize 
the human figure as a whole, it would take us an enormous 
effort to perceive instead of the whole man a pictorial unit 
consisting, say, of his right shoulder and arm, fragments of 
furniture and a section of the wall. But this is exactly what 
photography and, more powerfully, film may make us see. 
The motion picture camera has a way of disintegrating 
familiar objects and bringing to the fore – often just in 
moving about – previously invisible interrelationships 
between parts of them. 92  
 
This example of how structures of perception (the transcendental 
subject) may be reconfigured by the camera as a aesthetic 
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transcendental/social and technical augmentation of the subject also 
illuminates Kracauer’s interest in how material objects partially 
displace or relativise the centrality of the individual human subject 
presumed by bourgeois culture. Here Kracauer compares cinema to 
the bourgeois theatre and notes that where the actor is to fore on the 
stage, in the cinema, the object may vie with the actor as a co-
protagonist. Kracauer cites mad automobiles in comedy films, the 
cruiser Potemkin in Eisenstein’s film and the dilapidated kitchen in 
Umberto D as examples where ‘a long procession of unforgettable 
objects has passed across the screen’. 93  
 
This foregrounding of the inanimate materiality that makes up the 
environment, contrasts favorably with those ‘films in which the 
inanimate merely serves as a background to self-contained dialogue 
and the closed circuit of human relations’ 94 Here we certainly see a 
flash of the radical Kracauer from the Weimar years. Hansen sees the 
impulse to ‘deflate the image of the sovereign individual’ as the 
central allegorical meaning in Kracauer’s interest in the materiality of 
physical things. 95 Discussing the close-up in the films of D.W. 
Griffiths, Kracauer argues that this disclosure of new aspects of 
material reality penetrates down into the inner dynamics of reality 
and thus ‘leads us through the thicket of material life’. 96  
 
The thicket of material life – that is a suggestive metaphor and one in 
which the physical and the signifying converge in much the same 
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way that Kracauer thought of the hotel lobby as both a real space 
and an iconic image for detective fiction. When Kracauer talks of the 
camera metamorphosing nature, he is precisely talking about its 
cultural mediation by the sign, by matter-morphing.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Kracauer’s rehabilitation in the 1990s rather sidelined his Marxist 
framework of the middle-to-late Weimar era in favour of the then 
still dominant paradigms of post-structuralism and post-modernism. 
It was also silent on the relationship between Kant and Marxism in 
Kracauer’s work, which I have characterized as a transcoding of the 
Kantian problematic of reification into a Marxist framework that 
historicizes the problematic and subjects it to a dialectical critique 
while still maintaining the structural positions of ‘universal’ concepts 
that must be called into question, moral-political Ideas that must do 
the questioning and be activated in relation to the sense-percepts of 
the empirical individual immersed in history, and, crucially the 
aesthetic, which in the third Critique, functions as a point of 
mediation between them.  
 
Now, it perhaps has not escaped the reader’s notice that there is a 
argument going on here about the place of Kant in Marxist cultural 
philosophy that goes beyond how far we can discern the influence of 
Kant on Kracauer from the words of Kracauer himself.  As Robert 
Kaufman has noted, Kant’s influence on Marxist thinkers such as 
Adorno and Benjamin do not fit the standard Marxist interpretation 
of Kant’s philosophy and aesthetic as the acme of bourgeois 
thinking.97  Typically Kant’s influence is disavowed by various 
strategies. For example, in discussing Benjamin’s The Origin of 
German Tragedy, Jameson implies that Benjamin goes beyond and 
effectively repudiates the Kantian relationship between concepts – 
which are concerned with knowledge of objects – and Ideas which 
are concerned with the moral/political evaluation or truth of 
concepts. As Jameson notes, Benjamin proposes, very explicitly in The 
Origin of German Tragedy, that Ideas are the mode of configuring 
concepts in particular ways. Ideas have no content in their own right 
but are instead ‘the relationship between a group of concepts’. 98 But 
this sounds to me strikingly like Kant’s argument that Ideas provide, 
or ought to provide (were it not for the problematic of reification that 
Kant is struggling to evade) the moral/political inflection of concepts. 
They are not, for Kant, as with Benjamin, concepts themselves. This 
denial by Jameson of the proximity between Kant and Benjamin is 
typical of the Marxist consensus on Kant. Elsewhere I have suggested 
that Kant’s aesthetic, routinely lambasted for its supposed elitism, 
formalism and subjectivism, has been fundamentally misunderstood 
by Anglophone Marxism which has made it virtually synonymous 
with ideology. 99  A more complete and productive re-reading of 
Kant’s aesthetic from a Marxist perspective obviously lies outside the 
scope of this particular essay but the argument concerning the 
Weimar and American Kracauer’s transcoding of Kant is obviously an 
attempt to rehabilitate the latter as much as cast new light on the 
work of the former. 
                                                        
97 Kaufman 2000. 
98 Jameosn 2007, p. 54. 
99 Wayne 2012. 
 In his Marxist Weimar period, Kracauer read Kant’s transcendental 
subject as the sign of Ratio, rationality abstracted from reason, 
materiality (with its linear sequencing of natural cause-effect 
relations) divorced from a critical subjectivity, and abstract concepts 
resistant to their inflection by moral-political Ideas. Scathing of 
middle class culture, Kracauer critically engaged with the mass 
ornament and its immersion in the life and culture of the masses in 
the industrial age. It is precisely the mass ornament’s embodiment of 
the logic of reification that gives it a pedagogic value, while its form 
bears within it the trace of that form-bursting reason disavowed by 
the Ratio, and even has the potential to foster critical reflection on 
the condition of reification.  
 
The concept of distraction is one example of how Kracauer 
approached the mass ornament as a contradictory affair. Distraction 
could be a strategy by which the mind might settle on something 
apparently marginal that could in fact turn out to be the thread that 
leads to cognitive revelation. In the quasi-poetic linkages within 
Kracauer’s thought, appropriate to a philosophy suspicious of what 
had become of ‘logic’ and ‘concepts’, distraction converges with the 
notion of decomposition. De-reification of the commodity-image 
requires the decomposition of history, a productive distraction from 
the main event. Memory-images are indicative of a cultural resource 
that can feed a critical philosophy reconstructing what theory and 
the mass media miss.  
 
The American Kracauer is certainly distant in significant ways from 
the Marxist Kracauer of the Weimar years. There is no dialectic in the 
later Kracauer between fragment and social totality, no critique of 
abstract rationalism, no linkage of that to the mass media and no 
explicit critical framework for de-reification. Nevertheless there are 
some continuities which suggest a proximity to Benjamin and 
Kracauer’s Weimar self. There is a still evident interest in the 
relationship between the camera and material nature; an 
underdeveloped and incomplete but still suggestive model of the 
camera as a matter-morpher. It’s own ‘objective’ qualities have an 
affinity with the objective qualities of material nature and both are 
understood to be already mediated by the cultural and the subjective, 
understood as collectively produced. The transcendental camera is 
thus predisposed towards decomposing the reality it transforms. 
This is all part of a continuing subterranean interest in displacing and 
critiquing bourgeois subjectivity. Kant and Marx still seem to be 
active ingredients fermenting away in the late work; the Weimar 
Kracauer has not been completely repudiated by his American other. 
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